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The Stairways to Heaven: A Model of Career Choice in 
Sports and Games, with an Application to Chess
*
 
We model individual careers in sports and games from initial entry to eventual exit or success 
as a discrete-choice, finite-horizon optimization problem. We apply this model to the 
international game of chess and study cross-country differences in the relative success of 
players. While we find no evidence that the players in our sample from the ex-Warsaw Pact 
are more talented than European and American players, there is evidence that they face 
lower training costs. 
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disclaimer applies. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
"The economy is a key factor in the Ukrainian chess boom. Playing chess is a prestigious
occupation and you can earn money with it. Additionally, you travel around the world. So,
a professional chess player has respect, unlike in Europe or the USA. By our standards,
chess is a good career." (Grandmaster Alexander Moiseenko in a ChessCafe.com interview)
In many sports and games, players start training very early but only few succeed and
make it to stardom. While the positive relationship between earnings and ability is general,
these professions are rather unique in that the eﬀect of ability on earnings is highly convex,
and those who make it often earn a substantial reward (see MacDonald, 1988). In expected
terms, however, one needs to multiply such reward by a very low probability of success. Why
then do many youngsters try to climb the stairways to professional heaven? According to
Rosen and Sanderson, 2001, this happens because entrants have the option to quit and walk
away at some early stage of their training. Entry into sports and games - they suggest -
should be considered as a sequential stopping problem: each new player starts with an a
priori probability of success, which he updates using the almost continuous feedbacks about
his performance. When the record becomes suﬃciently unfavorable, he quits and moves to
something else.
Only those with a reasonably good record are prepared to submit to the entire 10 - year
rule of preparation which is deemed necessary on average to acquire expert performance in
the arts, science, sports and games (Ericcson, 1996). Since the main skills are general to the
game, and not speciﬁc to the eventual team, entrants need to bear a substantial share of the
training costs, especially since free agency has become widespread (Rosen and Sanderson,
2001; Szymanski, 2003). How important are these training costs relative to expected returns
and to innate talent? What is the probability of success for a potential entrant to a sport
or game? What is the informational content of the performance feedbacks received in the
initial steps of a career? Is there any cross - country variation in these critical factors which
might explain why a nation excels in a sport or game?
In this paper we address these questions by modeling individual careers in a sport or
game from initial entry to eventual exit or success as the outcome of a discrete - choice, ﬁnite
- horizon deterministic optimization problem, much in the spirit of Keane and Wolpin, 19971.
We treat decision making as sequential. Young entrants in each period of their career face
three alterative choices: to dropout, to go for a professional career leading either to failure
1See also Belzil and Hansen, 2000.
1or to stardom (tryout), and to wait for additional feedbacks on performance. Measured
performance is a noisy indicator of the underlying talent. By waiting, players can collect
more information and delay the choice to dropout or tryout2.
We apply this model to the game of chess. One advantage of using chess data is that
players are ranked according to a precise measure of relative performance called ELO.C h e s s
also shares with many sports and games the tiny probability of becoming a star and earning
money: in October 2006 there were only 20 players with an ELO score higher than or equal
to 2700 in the international list of close to 50 thousand players with an oﬃcial rating, and
only close to 1 percent of the list had attained the 2500 threshold. Another advantage is
that, compared to other individual sports3, chess is truly an international game, with more
than 60 countries represented in the international list of rated players published by the
International Chess Federation (FIDE). Interesting cross - country variation is present.
For instance, close to a third of the top 20 players come from the Russian Federation,
including chess superstar Garry Kasparov and World Champion Vladimir Kramnik. Russia
has more than 5 thousand listed players, and 2 percent of them have attained an ELO score
above 2500. In comparison, Germany has slightly less than 5 thousand enlisted players, but
only 0.5 percent of them with ELO ≥ 2500, and no player in the top brass. Furthermore,
India has only 2 thousand players in the list, with 0.4 percent attaining ELO ≥ 2500 and
1 player with ELO ≥ 2700.
Even though the chess player data keeps track of chess players from relatively early
stages of their career4, we do not have information on the full population of entrants, which
is typically larger than the sub-set of players rated by FIDE. To illustrate, there were 1267
US players rated in the list in January 2003, versus 38364 players included in the 2002
rating list provided by the US Chess Federation. Since FIDE only rates players who have
attained a given performance score in FIDE - sponsored tournaments, the international
2As usual in this class of models, there is no closed form solution to the individual decision rule, and we
need to turn to numerical solutions. These solutions are inputs to maximum likelihood estimation based
on the observed realizations of individual choice. We maximize the likelihood with respect to three key
parameters of the model, the cost of training, the probability of success and the variance of the noise in the
sequential screening process.
3We do not use more popular professional sports with richer and readily available data such as baseball,
soccer, hockey, etc., primarily because individual performance is more diﬃcult to measure in these team
sports and games.
4This is another important advantage of the chess. In many professional sports, richer panel data of
players are available, but no other data even come close to those on chess in terms of the coverage of the
early stages of the career. For example, even in baseball, there is no established panel data for minor league
players, who already have passed the stage of "try-out", based upon our terminology introduced later on.
2list is a self-selected subset of the population of players, which most likely includes only
those players who are seriously considering a career in chess.
We build a longitudinal panel of young players - aged between 10 and 18 in their initial
year in the panel - and follow them for three to ﬁve years, depending on the cohort. By
focusing on young age at entry, we reduce the problems associated to left censoring, which
is more likely for older age groups. The selected age bracket includes the median age when
players start playing chess seriously, which according to Chairness, Krampe and Meyr, 1996,
is 15, and the time window captures a critical stage of a chess career, which can peak as
early as at age 255.W eﬁnd that the behavior of the players in our sample is consistent with
the model, which suggests that individuals are more likely to select a professional career
when the expected returns are high and the training costs are low.
We use the cross - country variation in the data to group individual players according
to whether they belong to the ex-Soviet bloc, with its long chess tradition, or to the rich
countries of Europe and America, or ﬁnally to the low income countries of Asia, such
as India and China, and highlight the fact that players from the ex-Warsaw Pact in our
sample tend to dropout signiﬁcantly less and to move to a professional career more than
the players from the other two groups. We ask whether this is due to a higher proportion
of talented players in the sample, or to other economic factors, such as the cost of training
or the expected returns from a successful career relative to alternative options. Maximum
likelihood estimates provide the following answer: players from Russia and its neighbors
included in our data set are not particularly more talented, at least compared to European
and American players, but face substantially lower training costs, mainly because of their
lower opportunity value of time. The underlying diﬀerences in the alternative value of time
can also explain the diﬀerent patterns of selection occurring in our data: since players from
richer countries have more and better alternative opportunities to chess - and higher training
costs relative to earnings - the observed proportion of talented players in our censored data
set is likely to be higher in these countries than among low income countries and the
countries of the ex-Warsaw Pact.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some basics for later discussion,
and Section 3 presents the ﬁnite - horizon discrete - choice model. Section 4 introduces
the game of chess and Section 5 looks at the data at our disposal. Section 6 is devoted
5"Chess has become much younger. Unfortunately, the career span of a chess player has decreased
substantially. Botvinnik played championship matches after forty, but now a player of that age is over-the-
hill" (Anatoly Bykhovsky in an interview in www.chesscafè.com).
3to the empirical analysis, and features both estimates based on the ordered probit and
the competing risks model and the maximum likelihood estimate of the key parameters.
Conclusions follow.
2T h e T h e o r y : b a s i c s
Assume that a small proportion p ∈ (0,1) of the population is endowed with the talent of
interest. Endowed talent is not directly observed and has no market value by itself, unless
the holder trains to master the art or the sport. After training, the market value of talent
is β > 1, higher than the normalized cost of training (equal to 1). On the other hand,
training is useless when applied to those without talent. When training is costly and the
candidate player has limited information on whether she is talented, a performance test can
reveal additional information before substantial investment takes place and the relevant
direct and opportunity costs are sunk. Typically, the outcome of the test is a noisy signal
of true talent. Let s be such outcome - a test score - and deﬁne
s = e + u (1)
where e is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the individual is talented and to 0 otherwise6,
and u is noise, which follows the normal distribution with zero mean and known standard
deviation σ.
The presence of noise implies that the test statistic s is normally distributed with mean
1 and standard deviation σ for the sub-population endowed with talent, and normally
distributed with the same variance but zero mean for the rest of the population. It follows





σ )+( 1− p)φ( s
σ)
(2)
wherein φ is the standard normal density function.
Conditional on the test and allowing free entry of players, a risk neutral applicant7
should invest in training only if
6This assumption is clearly extreme, but in principle the analysis can be extended to encompass a
continuous measure of ability.
7See MacDonald, 1988, for a similar assumption in his analysis of the economics of rising stars. Rosen
and Sanderson, 2001, argue that the option value to quit and walk away from the sport or the game explains
why candidate players are not necessarily risk lovers.











and should be indiﬀerent when equality holds.
This eﬃciency condition is also the outcome of the following problem: ﬁnd the threshold
test score θ - such that those who score above or at the threshold have access to training
and the rest remains untrained - which maximizes total output net of training costs8






































which corresponds to Eq. (4) above. It says that the optimal threshold should be set to
balance - among those who attain the threshold value of the signal θ - the marginal beneﬁt
of training the talented - given by (β − 1)pφ(θ−1
σ ) - with the marginal cost of investing in
those without the talent - or (1 − p)φ( θ
σ). Using our distributional assumptions, Eq. (4)















1−p . The following results hold
Θp < 0,
Θβ < 0,
sign Θσ = sign(1 − α) > 0 if α < 1
8Groothuis, Hill and Perri, 2005, discuss similar issues using a diﬀerent setup.
9Since training those below the threshold obviously reduces the total surplus, the ﬁrst order condition is
suﬃcient for eﬃciency.
52.1 Interpretation and Some Numerical Examples
The optimal threshold θ should minimize two types of error: to reject the talented because
of their low score (Type 1 error) - which costs (β − 1) for each individual − and to train
those with high scores but little talent (Type 2 error) - which costs 1 for each trainee. When
the return to talent β increases, so does the cost of an erroneous rejection of the talented.
Hence, the threshold θ declines. Similarly, when p increases the total cost of Type 1 errors
raises and optimal θ declines.
Somewhat paradoxically, the result implies that under the optimal policy, a larger share
of the talented population do not pass the test precisely when the share of the talented
population is small. To illustrate, let p = .0025, so that only 1 person out of 400 is talented,
and assume σ = .5 and β = 100, so that the return from rare talent is a hundred times higher
than the training cost. In this case the optimal policy implies that 38% of the sub-population
of talented individuals are excluded from training, and that 4.5% of the population without
talent are trained. Since the share of the population without talent is predominant, only
3.4% of those who pass the test and are trained are endowed with talent, which suggests
that the sunk training costs are wasted 96.6 cases out of 100.N e x t a l l o w p to increase
while keeping σ and β ﬁxed. In this case the optimal threshold is lower than before and
more weight is placed on reducing the Type 1 error, at the cost of increasing the other
error: when p = .1, only 1.3% of the talented fail to pass the test, at the price of having
57.8% of the sub-population without talent admitted to training. In this case, the share of
talented trainees increases to roughly 16% of those who pass the test. Independently of the
value of the ex-ante probability p, establishing a performance threshold for admittance to
training increases the share of talented trainees relative to random allocation of training,
and thereby reduces waste.
Needless to say, the test can screen talents almost perfectly when the noise is small: when
σ is less than 1/5, both Type 1 and Type 2 errors are very small and the optimal threshold
is very close to 1/2 irrespective of the value of the other parameters. As σ increases, the test
becomes less precise, and the optimal policy depends on the relative size of β and p. When
these are high and α > 1, a higher variance reduces the optimal threshold. The opposite
pattern is observed when either β or p are relatively small so that α < 1.
63 The Theory: a multi-period model of selection and training
Sport and game players often make their critical decision to invest seriously in a professional
career after collecting noisy information on their hidden talent. By delaying their decision,
they can update their a priori belief of succeeding as a professional with the input of addi-
tional signals, the precision of which might increase with age, perhaps because ability can
be told apart more clearly from maturity. Delay, however, comes at the price of shortening
an already relatively short productive life span as a professional in the event of success.
When the decision to go for professional excellence is also a decision to train intensively,
delaying this critical step may also reduce the probability of succeeding if receiving intense
training early in life is critical for the sport or the art at hand10.
3.1 Setup
Talent aﬀects rewards but is unknown at the start of the relevant horizon. Assume that
individuals last T periods. At the beginning of each period they receive a signal about
their talent, the result or score of a performance test. In each period but the last they face
three alternative options: a) dropout from the race to stardom; b) decide to enter into a
professional career by making a substantive investment in training (from now on we shall
call this "tryout" for brevity); c) wait for additional information on talent. If tryout is
chosen, we assume that true talent is revealed at the end of the intense training period.
Hence the decision is ﬁnal and irreversible by construction. If the individual is talented,
he moves into a relatively short career as a star player in the ﬁeld. If he is not talented,
he earns the outside option11. Finally, if he chooses to drop out from the game, he will
no longer practice and hence he obtain no further signals. Again he will have no reason to
change the decision later on.
The technical training needed to become a star chess or piano player or a top professional
in the sports is general and produce portable skills, that can be used by and large when
the player moves from one employer to another. Following Becker, when training is mostly
general and labour markets are frictionless, training costs should be born by the training
recipient. While in real life training for a professional career is time consuming, it is conve-
nient to model it as an instantaneous event which requires that a positive cost C be sunk.
10Since the impact of this factor is qualitatively similar to a shortening of the time horizon, we do not
treat it explicitly hereafter.
11Our setting is similar to the problem of ﬁnding the best timing to exert a ﬁnancial option.
7Let Y be the alternative income per unit of time available to those who either drop out or
fail after training, and R the expected earnings in the event of success as a professional star.
Waiting requires that the individual spends time practicing his skills (such as playing the
game in an amateur league) in the event that the time to move into a professional career
comes. We normalize the income from waiting net of the cost of practicing to zero. By
waiting one more period rather than dropping out, the individual loses income Y , because
he cannot fully devote to the outside option, but maintains his skills in the case he can try
his luck as a professional. In such a case, he incurs the training cost C with the expectation
of earning R per year in the case of success and Y per year in the case of failure.
In the event of success, the discounted present value of net earnings of a talented player










where ρ is the discount factor. In the event of failure, he earns the default net income for
the remaining period of his active life so that its present value is
Dk = MkY (13)
It follows that the expected return from trying out is
Ak = qk(sk,p)Sk +( 1− qk(sk,p))Dk − C
where qk be the ex - post probability of being talented after observing k consecutive test
scores, sk is the test score at the kth trial and sk ≡ 1
k
Pk
i=1 si. In the next sub sections, we
derive qk(sk,p) as a solution to a sequential updating.
If the decision to dropout occurs before trying out and after observing the score sk,t h e
player earns Y per period and the training cost C is saved. Therefore, his present discounted
value is
Qk = MkY
Assume risk neutrality12. Since each available choice generates an expected income ﬂow
12The impact of risk aversion can be easily incorporated into the model. However, the data requirement
for the empirical implementation of the extended model goes beyond the available information. Therefore,
such an extension must be left for future research.
8from the time of choice to the end of productive life in period T,in each period of time k the
optimal policy of a risk neutral rational individual is to select the option which maximizes
her expected net income13.
In the rest of this section we characterize the optimal policy14. Notice that optimality in
our context refers to individual choices, and to the maximization of expected income in an
inter-temporal setting. We also stress that, since both earnings per unit of time and training
costs are taken as given by each individual, our results are typically partial equilibrium.
3.2 Preliminaries
Assume that tests are independent events. When the noise of the tests is drawn from a
normal distribution with zero mean and a given size of standard deviation, the following
Lemma holds.
Lemma 1 Conditional on k score observations (s1,s 2....sk) the probability of being
talented is
qk≡ q (s1,s 2....sk)=
prk
prk +( 1− p)
k=1,2,...T (14)








and sk ≡ 1
k
Pk
i=1 si.Therefore, the average score (sk) is a
suﬃcient statistic for the Bayesian updating rule. Moreover, the posterior probability qk is
monotonically increasing in sk and converges to unity (zero) as sk →∞ (−∞).
Proof The Lemma follows from the deﬁnition of conditional probability
















13The dynamic programming problem faced by each player is stochastic because there is uncertainty about
the endowed talent and the received signal is noisy. The solution to this problem is a function both of the
underlying parameters and of the sequence of test scores. Once these are known, the optimal decision can
be perfectly predicted. Therefore, the transition to the econometric implementation of the model requires
that we add to it other sources of uncertainty. We do so by introducing hidden state variables, as discussed
in Section 6. In the current section, however, we treat all the variables and payoﬀs as deterministic, with
the exception of the performance signal.
14Standard references for the model at hand are Jovanovich (1979a,1979b) and Roberts and Weitzman
(1981). See also Brien, et al (2007) for an application of Jovanovich’s model to the marriage and divorce.





















The result is immediate once we substitute these expressions in the deﬁnition of qk.QED














Since the density of the score history (s1,s 2,...s k) f o rt a l e n t e da n dn o nt a l e n t e di n d i v i d -
uals is HS
k and HU
k respectively, the density for the population of candidates is
f (s1,s 2,...s k)=pHS
k +( 1− p)HU
k (16)
and the conditional distribution of score sk given the previous scores is














1μk−1 where 0 < μ < 1 (18)
so that the test becomes more precise over time, as individual ability is more easily told
apart from other confounding traits, such as maturity15. In this case Lemma 1 needs to be
reformulated to obtain
qk≡ q (p,s1,s 2....sk)=
pgk
pgk +( 1− p)
k=1,2,...T (19)
where















When the variance of the noise is time varying, the suﬃcient statistic is the weighted
average of past and current test scores, with weights inversely proportional to the size of
the variance. In either case, the posterior probability of being talented, qk, is a monotonic
increasing function of the average score, sk or e sk.
3.3 The Optimal Policy








Ak(qk(sk,p)) = qk(sk,p)Sk +( 1− qk(sk,p))Nk − C (23)
= Qk +
h
qk(sk,p)Mk(R − Y ) − C
i
, (24)
Qk = MkY, (25)
and EVk+1(qk(sk,p))16 are the values of trying the professional career, dropping out, or
waiting for an additional signal respectively. The value of dropping out, Qk, is independent
of sk. We show the following.








Proof See the Appendix.






16The analysis below does not depend on whether or not the suﬃcient statistic of the score history is the
arithmetic mean sk or e sk.
11because as sk →∞ ,qk(sk,p) → 1 so that there is no point in waiting for the next period.
By the same token, we know that
lim
sk→−∞
Ak(qk(sk,p)) = Qk − C<Q k
because as sk →− ∞ ,qk(sk,p) → 0 so that the payoﬀ from trying out converges to Qk −C.
Putting these results together, we conclude that: (a) the Ak schedule is steeper than the
ρEVk+1 schedule (Lemma 2); (b) Ak eventually overtakes ρEVk+1 as we increase sk; (c) the
Ak schedule lies below Qk at suﬃciently negative values of sk. Therefore, we know that Ak
cuts both ρEVk+1 and Qk from below at some ﬁnite values of sk. Although these properties
do not guarantee that limsk→−∞ ρEVk+1(qk(sk,p)) <Q k for arbitrary values of k, ρEVk+1
evidently lies below Qk when k is suﬃciently close to the terminal period T. Assuming that
this condition holds17,t h e r ea r et w op o s s i b l ec o n ﬁgurations of the three schedules.
As shown in Figure 1A, if the intersection of the waiting (V ) and trying out (A) schedules
occurs above the quitting schedule (Q), then all three options are viable: training for a
professional career is the best choice for suﬃciently high values of sk, quitting is the best
choice when sk is low, and waiting is the best choice for intermediate values. Denote by θD
k
the threshold at which the value of quitting and the maximum of trying out and waiting are
the same, and let θW
k be the threshold at which training for a professional career generates
the same expected value as waiting one more period. In the ﬁgure, θD
k < θW
k , and all the
three options are viable. In this case, the optimal policy in period k is
Qk = Vk(qk(sk,p)) if sk ≤ θD
k (27)
EVk+1(qk(sk,p)) = Vk(qk(sk,p)) if θD
k <q k(sk,p) < θW
k (28)
Ak(sk)=Vk(qk(sk,p)) if qk(sk,p) ≥ θW
k (29)
In the second conﬁguration - see Figure 1B - the intersection of the V and A schedules
lies below the Q schedule so that θD
k ≥ θW
k . In this case the waiting option is dominated
by either dropping out or by trying out (thus threshold θW
k is irrelevant), and the optimal
policy is
Qk = Vk(qk(sk,p)) if qk(sk,p) < θD
k (30)
17Numerical examples below show that indeed all three options occur with strictly positive probability in
all time periods except for the last.
12Ak(sk)=Vk(qk(sk,p)) if qk(sk,p) ≥ θD
k (31)
When the latter conﬁguration occurs, all the players who have chosen to wait until period
k either go for a professional career or dropout. Therefore, there will be no active players
waiting for additional signals at the end of period k.L e t κ be the smallest value of k at
which all individuals who have chosen to wait until this period choose either Qk or Ak(sk),
thereby leaving no players in the waiting pool for the next period. At that point in time,
the decision process ends, as all the players will have either dropped out or moved into
professional careers, and these decisions are irreversible. This is certainly the case at k = T,
because there is no time left to wait for. Therefore, in general, κ ≤ T.
Since nothing of substance depends upon whether or not κ <T ,we derive in the
Appendix the set of optimal policies under the assumption that κ = T.In short, the optimal
policy is completely characterized by the two thresholds θD
k and θW
k . For any period k<κ,
θD
k < θW
k and the optimal policy involves the choice of one among the three available
options. When k ≥ κ, θD
k ≥ θW
k and waiting is no longer a viable option. Therefore, the
players left in the pool of candidates choose either to quit or to try out. In short, the
optimal policy is a simple stopping rule, which depends only upon the history of signals. In
the next subsection, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the comparative statics of
the model.
3.4 Comparative statics based upon numerical solutions
As it is usually the case in these class of models, there is no closed form representation of
the two critical thresholds and we need to turn to numerical solutions18. These solutions
can also be used to illustrate the comparative statics of the model. Deﬁne c = C
Y and
r = R
Y . On the one hand, when we allow the underlying parameters to vary within a broad
range, we always ﬁnd that both thresholds θW
k and θD
k are monotonically increasing in c
and decreasing in r and p, in line with common sense: players are expected to reduce the
critical thresholds when faced with a lower cost of trying out, higher returns, and a higher
ex-ante probability of being talented.
On the other hand, it is not immediately obvious how the two thresholds change when
the noise parameter σ increases. Notice that what matters for the optimal decision is not
18Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006) builds and estimate a model of marriage and divorce employing a dynamic
programming model in which Bayesian updating of the expected value of match. They also need to augment
the model with additional assumptions even to establish a basic property of reservation values.
13the level of the thresholds per se, but the ratio of each threshold to the standard deviation
of the noise. Therefore, we shall consider these ratios in the ensuing discussion. An increase
in the size of the noise raises uncertainty and reduces the informativeness of the signal,
which leads to higher costs associated to both types of errors, as discussed in the simple
static model of Section 2. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, we ﬁnd that players are induced
to raise the ratio of each threshold to the standard deviation of the noise when thresholds
are relatively high- and Type 2 errors matter most - and to reduce them when thresholds
are relatively low, and it is the Type 1 error that matters relatively more. A confounding
factor in evaluating the overall impact of σ is how the option value of waiting varies with
t h es i z eo ft h en o i s e .F i g u r e4 ,w h e r ew ep l o t θW
k −θD
k as a function of p and σ, shows that
waiting becomes a more favorable option when the size of the noise increases19.
4T h e G a m e o f C h e s s
If you want to know whether a chess player is relatively strong or weak, just ask him his ELO
score. This measure - devised by Arped Elo, an Hungarian mathematician, with the purpose
of ranking chess players according to their cumulative performance in chess tournaments
- is published four times a year by the International Chess Federation (FIDE)f o rr a t e d
players, who are seriously considering a career in chess. To be rated, a player must have
attained an ELO score of 1400 o rm o r e .H a v i n gar a t i n gi su s u a l l yar e q u i s i t et op a r t i c i p a t e
in FIDE sponsored tournaments, where players can increase their score and achieve norms,
the building blocks to becoming an International Master or a Grandmaster20.
Brieﬂy, ELO is based on the comparison of actual and expected performance. Expected
performance is the performance that a player with a given ELO score is expected to attain
in a tournament after considering the ELO of his opponents. When actual performance
diﬀers from expected, the ELO score is revised accordingly, with a gradient that is higher
for weaker players and lower for Grandmasters21. While important, ELO is not the only
thing to strive for in chess. The other thing is chess titles, which are for life. A star
chess player needs to become a Grandmaster, which requires an ELO score of at least 2500
plus two norms - each norm being attained by defeating other Grandmasters in recognized
19The impact of a change in μ is qualitatively the same as the impact for σ. Further details are available
from the authors upon request.
20See the FIDE Handbook downloadable from www.ﬁde.com. Notice that the US Chess Federation uses
as l i g h t l yd i ﬀerent rating system. Chabris and Glickman, 2005, is a paper which uses USCF data.
21See www.ﬁde.com for further details.
14tournaments.
Star chess players start early. Bobby Fischer, the former World Champion, spent 9
years of hard training before becoming a Grandmaster at age 1622. The Polgar sisters, who
eventually rose to the rank of Grandmaster or International Master, also started very early
and received intensive training by their father Lazslo, who tutored them at home in chess
and else23. However, an early start does not appear to be the key factor, at least when
compared to hard study and intense practice or training (see Charness, Krampe and Mayr,
1996, and Gobet and Campitelli, 2007).
In spite of the intensive eﬀort, monetary returns are meager unless the player rises to the
true stardom of 2700 ELO score or above. These players get $10,000 plus appearance fees
just to play in a tournament, regardless of result. Any active player with such a rank could
get $100,000 plus a year just in appearance fees, in addition to a share of the estimated
few million dollars in prizes at stake in FIDE sponsored tournaments, including the World
Championship24.T h eELO 2600 level players have a much tougher time as they do not get
signiﬁcant appearance fees, so they have to win tournament prize money for their earnings.
This is highly competitive and subject to dramatic ﬂuctuations, but $25,000 to $50,000 per
year appears to be a reasonable range. Players at the 2500 ELO level really can’t survive on
tournament prize money, so they need to teach. Rates for chess coaches vary by geographic
location, and could be $50 per hour in the US25.
While the chess tournament network is international, training typically takes place in
the home country, when the chess player is still a teenager or in his early twenties. Current
world champion Vladimir Kramnik trained in Russia, and the Indian superstar Viswanathan
Anand in India. Some top Russian players typically move to the US in the early stages
of their professional careers, but many remain in their own country26. Therefore, their
alternative income during training, a major factor aﬀecting total training costs, is also




24We estimate that the prizes at stake in the 2006 tournaments reported by FIDE summed up to 4 million
dollars.
25We thank without implicating Clint Ballard of the Seattle Sluggers for providing us with valuable
information on the earnings of chess players.
26In our data we reassign most migrant ex-Soviet Union players to their country of origin. Exceptions are
teenager migrants, who are likely to have incurred part of their training in their new country. An example
is Gata Kamsky, who moved to the US from Russia at age 15.
15Table 1 presents some information on international chess, drawn mainly from the FIDE
rating lists. The ﬁrst column shows the number of rated players as of October 2006 in a
selected number of countries. By far, players from ex-Soviet Union are the largest group in
the list, followed by Germany. In England, 1.288 rated players out of 100 makes it to the
ELO 2500 threshold. This share falls to 0.458 in India and rises to 2.207 in the ex-Soviet
Union. Assuming that chess stardom requires an ELO score of 2700, only a tiny fraction of
the total - 20 players - manages to climb at the top of the stairways to chess heaven, and this
elite is dominated by ex-Soviet Union players (16 out of 20). In the Russian Federation and
previous Soviet satellites, close to 1 individual in a million makes it to ELO 2500, compared
to a meager 0.009 in India.
As an admittedly gross indicator of annual relative earnings of star chess players we
use the ratio of average earnings - which we evaluate at 90 thousand dollars per year27 -
to average alternative income Y , which we proxy with national income per capita in US
dollars and at 2005 prices (source: The World Bank). As expected, this ratio is very high for
India (125),a b o v e10 for the ex-Soviet countries (16.860) and between 2 and 4 for European
countries and the USA28.
5T h e D a t a
Our model describes how individuals use the available information on earnings, costs and
alternative options to optimally decide in each period of time whether to go for a profes-
sional career, dropout or simply wait for additional information on their underlying talent.
Individual choice is aﬀected by the a priori probability of being talented p as well as by
training costs and expected earnings relative to the alternative value of time. While these
costs and returns vary both within and between countries, our data are not rich enough to
capture all these sources of variation. On the one hand, we have information on individual
careers from the oﬃcial FIDE rating lists; on the other hand, we only have country speciﬁc
information on costs, returns and alternative income.
The FIDE rating lists contain individual information on the country of aﬃliation, the ID
27Using the information kindly provided by Clint Ballard, we assume no discounting and that a top chess
player earns 100 thousand dollars a year for one third of his 30 - years long career, 150 thousand dollars
for another third and 20 thousand for the ﬁnal third. Notice that since expected earnings are made in the
international market, all cross country variation comes from the variation in Y .
28The observed ranking of countries with respect to relative earnings would not change if we were to use
the earnings of college graduates rather than average income per head.
16number, the current ELO score, the year of birth, the FIDE title and the number of games
rated in the rating period29. To reduce left censoring, we restrict our attention to players
aged 10 to 18 at their ﬁrst entry into the panel, and consider three cohorts of diﬀerent
individuals, who have entered the lists in 2001, 2002 and 2003. We follow these cohorts
year by year until 2006, and thereby construct a three to ﬁve - year window of observation
of individual behavior, depending on the cohort. While relatively short, this panel allows
us to follow players during key years of their careers.
As stressed in the introduction, FIDE does not list all chess players enrolled in national
chess federations, but only those who have attained a threshold rating30, which varies over
time and has recently been raised to 2000 ELO points. To illustrate the implications
of this, it is useful to compare the number of listed US players with the full list of non
scholastic USCF members. On the one hand, the USCF list of members in 2002 included
more than 38000 players, of which almost 20 percent did not have a score comparable to
ELO = 100031, and over 60 percent did not attain ELO = 1500. On the other hand, the
FIDE list in January 2003 included 1267 p l a y e r sw i t ha na v e r a g eELO score above 2200.
These must belong to the selected sub-group of serious elite players, for whom the choice
discussed in this paper - dropout or tryout a professional career - is signiﬁcant32.F r o m
the viewpoint of our study, it is important to stress that our data are not representative
of the underlying population of chess players, which also includes scholastic chess. By
selecting a sub-sample of young teenagers we can trace their performance and decisions
in the early stages of their career, thereby reducing the problem of left censoring, but we
cannot completely undo the impact of self-selection into the sample.
Compared to other games or sports, chess does not have an explicit league structure.
While there is no explicit ELO threshold for the attainment of a professional licence, we
29See the FIDE Handbook, Section 9.0, for details. Ranks are Candidate Master, FIDE Master, Interna-
tional Master and Grandmaster.
30FIDE rating is of course not a perfect measure and the rating at the early stage can be somewhat more
noisier than those with longer records. Discussions with those who are listed in FIDE ranking assured us,
however, that the rating of players in our sample are extremely unlikely to have such problems unique to
early stages. Importantly, the rating of a new player who appears in the FIDE list requires that he/she has
played at least 9 games. So, even if the player in his ﬁrst FIDE tournament is assigned a high rating , say,
2200 (which is the ELO score threshold we use), the ﬁr s tr e c o r di nt h el i s ti sa f t e r9g a m e s .T h u se v e ni f
initial rating of 2200 is noisy, the impact of initial rating error is not in our sample. We were also informed
from contacts of players that initial rating of 2200 is unheard of.
31USCF uses a diﬀerent rating system than FIDE, although the basic principles are the same. As a rule
of thumb, USCF ratings are about 100 points higher than FIDE ratings for the same individual.
32Amateur players are most likely to be ranked low and to be engaged in an alternative major professional
activity.
17believe that attainment of the 2300 threshold, which allows individuals to become FIDE
trainers, is a reasonable benchmark for those trying out a professional career which might
lead to stardom33. Hence our deﬁnition of try-out is to pass this threshold ELO score. We
also deﬁne as dropouts the players who in the current and next year have or are expecting to
have an ELO rank below 2200 a n de x p e c tt op l a yn or a t e dg a m ei nt h en e x ty e a r 34.F i g u r e
5 plots the distribution of ELO scores in the years 2001 and 2006 for the cohort who enters
our sample in 2001. Notice the very thin tail below ELO 2000, which can be explained with
t h ef a c tt h a tFIDE has recently changed its admission criteria for new players, who need
now to score at least 2000 to be rated. Median ELO was 2153 in 2001 and 2217 in 2006,
slightly below mean ELO in either year35.
Deﬁne the initial pool of players as the group of survivors, and let the hazard from
this pool be irreversible exit either into a professional career (tryout) or into alternative
professional activities (dropout). Letting t b et h et i m es p e n ti nt h ep o o lf r o mt h ei n i t i a l
to the ﬁnal observation period, a useful tool to describe our data is nonparametric survival
analysis. Following Marubini and Valsecchi, 2004, we compute for each competing risk -
tryout or dropout - the cumulative incidence function, which is equivalent to 1 minus the
Kaplan Meier curve in standard duration analysis36. The cumulative hazards by cohort
and year are reported in Table 2, and show that substantial between - cohort heterogeneity
exists in our data, partly because the composition of players by country in each cohort
markedly diﬀers.
The cumulative incidence functions for the full sample and for three sub-samples -
the players belonging to the ex-Warsaw Pact (EXS), where chess has a long standing
tradition, those belonging to the "rich" countries (RIC), which we deﬁne as the countries
with higher than median income per head, and the rest (RES)37 -a r es h o w ni nF i g u r e s6
33Due to the left censoring of our sample, we treat those who enter the sample with an initial ELO score
above 2300 as players trying out in the initial period.
34We use actual values in the next year as measures of expected values. As the terminal year we take
October 2006.
35Arpad Elo initially assumed that chess performance was normally distributed. Sub-sequent research has
shown that this is not the case. Based on this both FIDE and USCF have switched to formulas based on
the logistic distribution.
36This is done using the Stata 9.0 command stcompet.
37Rich countries outside the ex-Soviet Bloc have average income per head above median income in the
sample of 44 countries considered in this study. They include EU members plus Singapore, Australia, the
USA, Canada and Israel. "Poor" countries are: Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, China, India, Iran, Mongolia,
Peru, Turkey and Vietnam. "Ex-Warsaw Pact" countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Georgia, Kazakistan, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Turkmenistan and Ukraina.
18and 7. Considering ﬁrst the former ﬁg u r e ,w en o t i c et h a tw h i l et h ec u m u l a t i v eh a z a r di n t o
a professional career is convex, with the hazard accelerating from the fourth year onwards,
the cumulative hazard into dropping out is concave, with the hazard declining as time goes
by. Turning to the cross - country comparisons in Figure 7,w eﬁnd that EXS players
have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of dropping out than RIC and RES players. They
also have a higher probability of moving into professional careers, although the diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant only with respect to RES players.
Why do the players from the ex-Warsaw Pact have lower dropout rates and higher tryout
rates? The two - period model in the previous section suggests the following candidates
for an answer: a) players belonging to EXS countries are more talented - there is a higher
proportion of talented players p in the relevant population; b) they have a higher expected
relative return from professional success r; c) they face lower relative training costs c; d)
they encounter a more precise screening mechanism, or a lower standard deviation of the
noise σ. In the empirical section of the paper we shall try to shed some light on this issue
by using our longitudinal data of international chess players. We hasten to stress, however,
that - due to the nature of the data at hand, which are not representative of the underlying
population of chess players - our evidence is to be taken as exploratory and tentative at
best. It applies to our selected sample, and better data are required to evaluate whether it
can be extended to the population at large.
6 Empirical Analysis
The empirical section is organized in two sub-sections. We start in the ﬁrst sub-section with
an ordered probit and competing risks analysis of the relationship between career choice
and the available measures of expected costs and returns, using both the individual and the
cross country variation available in the data.
One limitation of this approach is that it cannot provide estimates of the key parameters
of the model, which include the proportion of talented individuals p, the relative training
cost c and the variance of the noise of the signals received by chess players. For this we
need to turn in the second sub-section to maximum likelihood estimates.
196.1 Ordered Probit and Competing Risks
The multi-period model in Section 3 of the paper implies that individuals in period k decide










where T is the length of time horizon, Ω = Ω(σ1,ρ) a n dw ea l l o wt h ev a r i a n c eo ft h e











Deﬁne an indicator variable d equal to 0 in the event of dropping out, to 1 when waiting
prevails and to 2 in the event of trying out. Further assume that the signal received by
the econometrician is noisy signal of the true performance measure thus contains error
εi
k ∼ N(0,σε). To put it diﬀerently, we posit that the ELO score used in the empirical
analysis is an unbiased but noisy indicator of the average test score si
k.Then individual
behavior in period k is predicted to be
di








k =0 if si
k + εi
k < ΘD(k,T,r,c,pi,Ω) (34)
and the associated probabilities are
Prob(di



































σε =ζ2 − X
0
β,w h e r eX is the
vector of measured explanatory variables, β is the vector of parameters and ζi are the cutoﬀ
points. Later on we amend the lack of unobservable individual prior pi by adjusting the
20error structure. The system (35) corresponds to the canonical ordered probit model, and
the vector X includes the average test scores, the relative return from professional success
and the relative cost of training. Since we have no data on individual costs and beneﬁts, we
proxy these variables with country - speciﬁc averages. Our measure of the ratio r = R
Y has
already been discussed above. The total cost of training C is assumed to be a linear function
of average income per head, which captures the opportunity value of time. We proxy the
direct cost of training with two variables, the availability of both internet connections and
domestic chess tournaments.
These days, chess can be played on line and with a PC, and most countries have internet
chess clubs where even grandmasters participate. Let WEB be the number of internet
users per 1000 inhabitants (source: www.worldbank.org). Ceteris paribus, individuals living
in countries where the internet is widespread are likely to face lower direct costs of training,
because they can access more easily the necessary material online. One prominent form of
training is the participation to tournaments. Cle a r l y ,t h ed i r e c tc o s to ft h i st y p eo ft r a i n i n g
is likely to vary with the availability of FIDE tournaments played within the country: young
Indian players can more easily train by competing in Indian events than by traveling to the
US or Russia in order to participate to a tournament38.W e u s e t h e FIDE databank to
collect information on the number of recognized tournaments played in each country during
the period 2001 to 2006 and deﬁne the ratio of this number to the population as TR.W e
expect that the higher this ratio the lower the cost of training. In sum, we model the cost









Table 3 shows the values of r, WEB and TR in our sample of 44 countries39.W h i l e
European countries and the US stand out in terms of low values of r and high values
of WEB,t h eEXS group excels in the number of tournaments per million inhabitants,
especially in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe (Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary).
Individual variables in our data set include age, the attained chess title, the number of
rated games played and the ELO score. Since our data are left censored, we control for
initial conditions by using the values of these variables at the time the individual enters the
38An example is the article on young Indian talent Lalit Babu appeared in the April 5, 2007 issue of The
Indu.
39We only retain countries in our sample with at least 3 players in the data set.
21sample. Finally, we proxy k with a linear time trend40.
The presence of the unobservable initial prior on talent (pi) in the functions deﬁning
the threshold values suggests that error terms are likely to be correlated over time for each
individual. We control for this by estimating an ordered probit with clustered standard
errors, with the cluster deﬁned by the individual, and experiment also with a random eﬀects
ordered probit model for our preferred speciﬁcation. Table 4 presents our results. We start
in column (1) with a parsimonious speciﬁcation, which includes only initial age, the time
trend and two dummies, one for EXS players and another for players from the RES group.
Column (2) adds to this speciﬁcation individual variables such as the initial ELO score,
the initial number of games played and the chess title at the time of entry in the sample41.
Column (3) further adds the country speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sr, WEB and TR. A comparison
of the Pseudo R Squared42 in the three columns shows that the additional contribution of
the country speciﬁc variables is small compared to that of initial ELO and initial chess
title. Column (4) presents the random eﬀect ordered probit estimation of the speciﬁcation
in the previous column. Finally, column (5) is equivalent to (3) with the exception that the
sample is restricted to individuals aged 10 − 14 a tt h et i m eo ft h e i rﬁrst entry in our data
set.
We ﬁnd that the probability of trying out (dropping out) is higher (lower) in countries
with a higher ratio of earnings to the alternative income and with a higher number of
internet users per 1000 inhabitants. The share of rated chess tournaments in the population
attracts the expected sign - positive but often imprecisely estimated. Furthermore, there
is evidence that more active - with a higher initial value of played games - and younger
players are more likely to tryout, and that trying out increases over time, while dropping
out declines. Conditional on these controls, our estimates show that trying out (dropping
out) is signiﬁcantly less (more) likely in the RES group of countries. Players from India,
China and other less developed countries tend to enter the FIDE d a t as e ta tar e l a t i v e l y
earlier age than players from Europe and North America, and with a higher initial ELO
score. This and the fact that their relative expected returns are very high suggests that
these players tryout more and drop out less than Europeans and North American. This is
40Recall that we have deﬁned d
i
k =2when individual ELO is above 2300, d
i
k =0when the score is below
2200 and d
i
k =1when it is in between.
41This variable takes the values 0 in the case of no title, 1 for candidate masters, 2 for FIDE masters, 3
for international masters and 4 for grandmasters.
42The pseudo-R
2 is deﬁned as 1 − (LL/LL0), where LL is the maximized log likelihood and LL0 is the
maximized log likelihood of the constant only model.
22not the case, however. We believe that a candidate explanation is that talented players from
less developed countries are liquidity constrained and often unable to sink the training cost
required to become a professional chess player. Finally, both the random eﬀects estimates
and those for the restricted sample in the last two columns of the table broadly conﬁrm the
results based on the pooled ordered probit model.
Table 5 compares the actual and predicted distribution of outcomes in the full sample
and in the three sub-groups of countries. While our model does a fairly good job, it also
shows a tendency to under-predict dropouts and over-predict tryouts. We compute the
marginal eﬀects of each explanatory variable on the probability of dropping out and trying
out and use these eﬀects for the following thought experiment: how much would the actual
probability of trying out or dropping out in the group of rich countries vary if we were to
assign to the players in this group the average values of the explanatory variables in the
EXS group? It turns out that the key variables in terms of the quantitative contribution
are the initial ELO score, the ratio r and the share of internet users WEB.I fw ew e r et o
assign to American players the initial ELO score of Russians, their probability of trying out
(dropping out) would increase (fall) by 26.6% (22.3%). On the other hand, the assignment of
the ratio r would raise (reduce) the probability of trying out (dropping out) by an additional
6.2% (5.2%). Finally, the assignment of the lower share WEB would reduce (raise) trying
out (dropping out) by 16.2% (13.4%).
Overall, the combination of these assignments can explain about 50% of the gap in the
tryout rate of players in the EXS and RIC groups of countries. This thought experiment
points out that the predicted diﬀerences in outcomes between the RIC and the EXS group
of countries are only partly explained by measured diﬀerences in expected returns and
training costs. An important additional factor which accounts for such diﬀerences is the
initial heterogeneity of players, and the fact that Russian players start at a young age in
our data with a signiﬁcantly higher ELO score than American and European players.
In the implementation of the ordered probit model we have controlled for left censoring
by including individual variables measured at the time of entry into the sample. However,
our data are aﬀected also by right censoring, because some individuals in the sample are
still waiting to acquire additional information at the end of our sample period. To explicitly
handle right censoring, we use survival analysis and a competing risks approach. According
to this approach, each sampled individual is at risk at each point in time of dropping out,
trying out or surviving into the next period. We use a Cox proportional hazard model
23with multiple hazards - as in Lunn and McNeil, 1995 - and correct the estimated variance
- covariance matrix by clustering (see Cleves, 1999). Reassuringly, our estimates of the
speciﬁcation in column (3) of Table 4 - presented in Table 6 - conﬁrm the main ﬁndings of
the ordered probit analysis: on the one hand, higher expected returns from a professional
career increase the tryout rate and decrease the dropout rate, which falls when the number of
country speciﬁc tournaments per inhabitant increases43. On the other hand, and conditional
on our controls, there is no remaining statistical diﬀerence between the players from the
ex-Warzaw Pact and European and North American players. If any such diﬀerence exists,
it is for the players from lower income countries such as India and China, who are less
likely to try a professional career and more likely to drop out than other players even after
controlling for the available individual and country speciﬁce ﬀects.
6.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of p, σ, μ and other parameters.
Are the Russians and their former neighbors in our sample better at chess because they
have a higher share of talented chess players, or is it as Lazlo Polgar - the father of the three
Polgar sisters - puts it, that hard work counts and innate talent does not matter after all?
To answer this question, we need estimates of the probability p and the cost of training c.
For this purpose, we adapt the model developed in Section 3 so that the likelihood function
associated to our sample of observations can be deﬁned. First, we allow the noise of the




which inﬂuence individual decisions but are not observed by the econometrician.
With these modiﬁcations, and conditional on the outcome of the kth performance test












where qk ≡ qk(e sk,p,σ,μ) is the posterior probability of being talented and e Ak(qk,u A
k ),
EVk+1(qk) and e Qk(u
Q
k ) correspond to trying out, waiting, and dropping out. Since the
information content of the test scores improves as players get older and mature, the posterior
probability qk is a function of the standard deviation of the noise at the youngest age in
the sample σ, the rate at which the noise declines over age μ, the prior probability p and
the adjusted average score e sk.
43We ﬁnd also that the variable WEB has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability
of trying out. Finally, the variable TR has a positive but imprecisely estimated eﬀect on trying out.

















44 has zero mean and known covariance matrix Σu : in this setup,
the current realizations of stochastic payoﬀs are observed by chess players but not by the
econometrician. Future realizations, however, are unobserved to both. Therefore, players
need to form rational expectations of EVk+1(qk) by considering both the possible realizations
of their performance measures and the realizations of the error terms45.
We show in the appendix that the standard backward induction method can be applied
with the use of the two thresholds, which, by the use of (37) and (38), can be given by
τ
AQ
k ≡ C − Mkqk+1(e sk+1)(R − Y )
τAW
k ≡ C + ρE [Vk+1|e sk] − Mk(qk+1(e sk+1)(R − Y )+Y )
where the former threshold refers to trying out versus quitting and the second threshold is



















44In order to avoid the possibility that a player waits even in the last period because of large negative
values of ut, we set uT ≡ 0. Since the ﬁnal decision period is set at age 30, this simpliﬁcation is totally
inconsequential in deriving likelihoods for sample players who are aged between 10 and 23.
45This is the most popular speciﬁcation used in the relevant literature, which uses numerical solutions
from dynamic programming as inputs of the maximum likelihood estimation. See Keane and Wolpin (1997)
and Rust (1994).
25where

































and I is an indicator taking the value 0 for dropping out, 1 for waiting and 2 for trying
out46. To each of these events we can associate predicted probabilities λ as follows
λ
j














Since we can only recover from our estimates the ratios between Y and R and C and R,




















The maximum likelihood estimator is
Ω∗ =a r gm a xL(Ω)
46As the vector of errors can vary from minus to plus inﬁnity, these probabilities are always strictly positive
for any ﬁnite values of thresholds.
26where N and T are the number of individuals in each cross section and the number of
available years, D is an indicator equal to 1 if the equality within parentheses is true and
to 0 otherwise47.
Because of the dynamic programming nature of the problem, each threshold varies with
the period k and depends on the length of the time horizon, which we assume to consist
of 30 periods or years (T = 30). To reduce computing time, we set the highest age when
a player can become professional at 30. With no waiting after that age, our computations
of the thresholds require that we carry backward induction at most for 20 years. Is this a
plausible assumption? To investigate this, we use an enlarged sample of players, with each
cohort including individuals aged 10 to 30 in their initial year in the sample, and plot the
percentage of players who at each age have passed the ELO 2300 t h r e s h o l da n dt r i e d—
a c c o r d i n gt oo u rd e ﬁnition - a professional career. It turns out that the cumulative hazard
into a professional career tapers oﬀ at about age 30 - see Figure 8. The maximization
problem is solved using MATLAB. Since the program can search for local maxima or
minima only, we start by looking for a rough ﬁrst order solution using grid search. By so
doing, we can make sure that the obtained local maximum is also a global maximum48.
Our estimates are shown in Table 7. The results are displayed in four columns, one
for the full sample and the rest for the EXS countries, the RIC countries and the RES
countries. In each column we report the estimated coeﬃcients and the standard errors .
The Likelihood ratio test veriﬁes whether the null hypothesis of common coeﬃcients across
the three groups can be rejected. Since the critical value of the test is 21.95549,the null is
easily rejected. The main ﬁndings are:
• The estimated share of talented players p in the full sample is 34 percent, a relatively
large number, suggesting that our sample of young players is already a very selected
sub-sample of the original population50;
• the share p is highest in the group of rich countries and precisely estimated, and lowest
and imprecisely estimated in the group of developing countries;
47Each individual disappears from our sample after trying out or dropping out.
48MATLAB takes between 90 minutes to 3 hours to converge. Details on the programs are available from
the authors upon request.
49The test statistic has a Chi Square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom.
50Notice, however, that in our setup talent is deﬁned as the capacity to earn R in the game of the chess for
the length of the professional career with posterior probability q. Given the estimate of − 90,000US$ - our
deﬁnition of talent is perhaps not as stringent as the one that corresponds to the truly great chess players.
27• the standard deviation of the noise declines sensibly with age, starting from above 3
at age 10 and rapidly declining to less than one at age 23 - except for the players of
the former Soviet block. Therefore, the precision of the tests is poor when players
are young but increases signiﬁcantly with age. Precision is highest for players of
rich countries and lowest for players from the former Soviet block. This pattern is
consistent with a rising hazard into trying out, because the waiting option is larger
when the uncertainty regarding future payoﬀsi sh i g h e r ;
• t h ec o s to ft r a i n i n gr e l a t i v et oe a r n i n g sR ranges from over 5 in the rich countries to
about 3 in the ex-Warsaw Pact countries and to close to 2 in the RES group. These
large diﬀerences across countries reﬂect both diﬀerences in direct training costs, as
documented in the previous sub-section, and diﬀerent opportunity values of time.
They imply that a successful chess player in a rich country needs more than 5 years
of earnings to make up for the training costs incurred in the preparation for success
after deciding to tryout, compared to less than three years from an EXS player and
to approximately 2 years for a RES player;
• consistent with the ﬁnding above, the opportunity cost is largest for the players of
the RIC group, followed by players of the EXS group, and lowest for players of the
RES group, although the relevant coeﬃcients are not precisely estimated;
• Table 8 shows the results when we select one country in each group, Spain for the rich
countries, Russia for the EXS group and India for the RES group. The results are
qualitatively the same as in Table 7;
• the estimated size of the shocks to the payoﬀs shows that payoﬀ uncertainty for trying
out is generally much larger than payoﬀ uncertainty for quitting. We also ﬁnd that
correlation between the two shocks is never statistically signiﬁcant and very small.
These results indicate the presence of a positive correlation across groups of countries
between the proportion of talented players in the sample and the cost of training relative
to expected returns. The high cost of training might explain why so few Europeans and
Americans make it to the chess stardom. These costs are very low in India and China, but
so is the proportion of individuals with the required talent. Russians emerge by combining
a moderate cost of training with a relatively good endowment of talented players.
28What is the relationship between the estimated share p and the population share? We
cannot tell, because the former is aﬀected by the self-selection of players into the FIDE
sample. But suppose that the population probability p is the same in Russia and the USA,
a plausible starting assumption. On the one hand, the plentiful alternative opportunities
available in the USA should take those not so talented away from chess, and only the
very talented and motivated would remain. A similar selection pattern is likely to result if
American players face higher training costs, as they do in our sample. On the other hand,
alternative opportunities are not so plentiful in Russia, and training costs are much lower.
Therefore, even those players with a smaller chance of being talented may decide to stay in
the chess game. If selection operates this way, the sample probability p should be higher
in the USA than in Russia, as we do ﬁnd, in spite of the two countries having the same
percentage of chess talents in the population at large.
If selection operates by attracting less talented people when outside opportunities are
meagre and training costs are low, one wonders however why the number of Russians in the
FIDE list is so overwhelmingly higher than the share of Chinese or Indians. Clearly, there
are other factors at stake that our empirical analysis cannot fully capture because of data
constraints, including the local culture, the relative ability of the local chess federation to
organize FIDE sponsored events, and the competition from other sports and games. If for
instance applications to join FIDE tend to concentrate at sponsored events, or these events
help in promoting the game, RES countries may turn out to have fewer listed players than
Russians or Europeans because they organize fewer events.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Entry in many sports and games can be described as a sequential stopping problem: each
new player starts with an a priori probability of success, which he updates using the almost
continuous feedbacks on his performance. When the record becomes suﬃciently unfavorable,
he quits and moves to something else. In this paper we have modeled individual careers from
initial entry to eventual exit or success using a discrete - choice, ﬁnite - horizon optimization
problem. We have applied this model to the game of chess, which we have selected because
of two main reasons: a precise measure of relative performance called ELO,a n dt h ec r o s s-
country dimension of this international game. Using a longitudinal panel of young players,
we have found that their behavior is consistent with key implications of the model, which
29suggest that individuals are more likely to select a professional career when the expected
returns are high and the training costs are low.
We have also used the cross - country variation in the data to group individual players
according to whether they belong to the ex-Warsaw Pact countries, with its long chess
tradition, or to the rich countries of Europe and America, or ﬁnally to the low income
countries of Asia, such as India and China, and have highlighted the fact that players from
the ex-Warsaw Pact tend to dropout signiﬁcantly less and to move to a professional career
more than the players from the other two groups. Maximum likelihood estimates suggest
that the players from Russia and its neighbors included in our data set are not particularly
talented, at least compared to European and American players, but face substantially lower
training costs, mainly because of the lower opportunity value of time.
Since our sample is not a representative draw from the population, we cannot generalize
our results. The natural question is how our estimated parameters relate to the population
parameters. Clearly, an answer to this question must await for better data. At the same
time, however, we speculate that the cross - country diﬀerences in the alternative value of
time and/or training costs can explain the diﬀerent patterns of selection occurring in our
data: because players from richer countries have more and better alternatives to chess, the
observed proportion of talented players in our censored data set is likely to be higher there
than among poorer countries and the countries of the ex-Warsaw Pact.
8A p p e n d i x
8.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof starts from the last period. Since waiting for one more period at k = T is
irrelevant because the value of waiting is zero, the slope condition trivially holds. Consider
now period T − 1.W eh a v et h a t
VT = Max
£
qT(sT)(R − C)+( 1− qT(sT))(Y − C),Y
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(R − Y − C)p
(1 − p)C
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T − (T − 1)sT−1
Otherwise, players dropout.
Then, at t = T − 1, the expected return is given by
VT−1(sT−1)=Max
£
qT−1(sT−1)(R − C)+( 1− qT−1(sT−1))(Y − C),Y,ρE [VT|sT−1]
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51In this appendix, we assume that the noise of the signal is distributed normally with zero mean and
age invariant variance. The case in which variance declines over age at a constant rate can be analyzed in a
similar manner and skipped.
31Given these expressions, we obtain
∂AT−1(sT−1)
∂sT−1































The eﬀect of sT−1 on the value of waiting is smaller than on the value of trying for two
reasons. First, by waiting players can draw at least one more test score, which reduces the
information content of the current signal. Second, by waiting at least one more period, the
impact of a given signal on the returns to talent becomes smaller, because less time is left
until the end of eventual professional life.





































































32= Mk(R − Y )
∂qk−1(sk−1)
∂sk−1























By induction, the above holds for any k =1 ,2,...,T.QED
8.2 The Optimal Policy and the Likelihood Function
In this appendix we show how we obtain the likelihood function. The appendix also applies
to the model in Section 3 simply by setting payoﬀ errors to zero.
At the beginning of period k, given the test score at the kth trial, the value function is
Vk(e sk)=Max[Ak(e sk),ρEVk+1(e sk),Q k]
where Ak(e sk),EV k+1(e sk),and Qk correspond, respectively, to trying out, waiting, and drop-
ping out, and we have
Ak(e sk)=qk(e sk)Sk +( 1− qk(e sk))Nk
= Mk
h
(R − Y )qk(e sk)+Y
i
− C + uA
t



























(R − Y )qk(e sk)+Y
¤
− C + uA
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52Notice that adding an error term to the waiting option does not change the substance. Since we can only
identify the diﬀerence in the error terms, there is no need to include the error term in the waiting option.
33where qk(e sk) is a shorthand for the posterior probability of being talented for a player with




1μk−1 where 0 < μ < 1 (18)







pgk +( 1− p)
k=1,2,...T
where























Given the realization of the score e sk, the optimal choice is given by
IT =2 iﬀ qT(R − C)+( 1− qT)(Y − C)+uA
T ≥ Y + u
Q
T









t )2 = σ2
A + σ2
Q − 2σAQ
The alternative choice is IT =0 , and the associated probabilities are:
34prob(IT =2 ) = prob
h







C − qT(e sT)(R − Y )
σW
¸
prob(IT =0 ) = 1 − prob(IT =2 )
= Φ
∙
C − qT(e sT)(R − Y )
σW
¸































and φ is the standard normal density function. The integration of the right hand side of







which is the expected value of waiting given the value of e sT.
To obtain the expected value of waiting conditional upon e sT−1, we need to integrate the


















































35Therefore the expected return at t = T − 1 is given by





In this case there are three options. The tryout option is the best choice if







qT−1(e sT−1)(R − Y )+Y
¢
− C + uA
T−1 ≥ ρe νT(qT−1(e sT−1),·)




T−1 + C − qT−1(e sT−1)MT−1(R − Y )
and
uA
T−1 ≥ C + ρe νT(qT−1(e sT−1),·) − MT−1
¡
qT−1(sT−1)(R − Y )+Y
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T−1 ≡ C − MT−1qT−1(e sT−1)(R − Y )
τAW
T−1 ≡ C + ρE [VT|e sT−1] − MT−1qT−1(e sT−1)(R − Y )





















Similarly, the probabilities associated to the other two events are










































































































DT−1 ≡ {uT−1 : IT−1 =0 }
WT−1 ≡ {uT−1 : IT−1 =1 }
AT−1 ≡ {uT−1 : IT−1 =2 }
























In general, the following recursive procedure can be applied:
371. Compute (A.7) for νT. Proceed backward.
2. At period k,given ρvk+1,compute:
Vk(e sk)=Max
∙






3. Compute the probabilities







































k ≡ C − Mkqk+1(e sk+1)(R − Y )
τAW



















Dk ≡ {uk : Ik =0 }











Wk ≡ {uk : Ik =1 }








Ak ≡ {uk : Ik =2 }
























6. Go back to 2 and repeat the procedure for k − 1.
8.2.3 Likelihood function
Once we have completed the procedure above, we have
λ
j









Against these predicted probabilities, we have the set of data for individual players’ decision



























so that the maximum likelihood estimator is the solution to
Ω∗ =a r gm a xL(Ω)
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Table 1. Some stylized facts about chess  
  Number of 
players with 
1400 ≥ ELO  
Share of 
players with 








2500 ≥ ELO  
per million 
of population 
Y R/  
England  699  1.288 0.143 0.150  2.393 
France  3049 0.361 0.033 0.181  2.585 
Spain  3867 0.181 0.000 0.161  3.548 
Germany  4718 0.551 0.000 0.315  2.602 
Ex Soviet Union  10106  2.207  0.158  0.972  16.860 
India  2183 0.458 0.046 0.009 125 
USA  937  1.494 0.107 0.047  2.057 
       
Notes:  
1.  only players born from 1967 onwards; ELO data are from www.fide.com 
2.  R/Y = Y  is income per head from the World Bank in 2005 US dollars; R 
       = expected annual income in the event of success, computed as  
30
10 * $ 000 , 150 10 * $ 000 , 100 10 * $ 000 , 20 ( + +
=90000$  
Table 2. Cumulative hazards by cohort and year. 
         
Cohort 1  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006
Dropout   .098  .151  .193  .201  .217  .230 
Tryout    .031 .054 .085 .095  .168  .243 
          
Cohort 2  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006   
Dropout    .163 .288 .319 .346  .379   
Tryout    .008 .019 .027 .088  .217   
          
Cohort 3  2003 2004 2005 2006   
Dropout    .375 .423 .460 .487     
Tryout    .005 .008 .047 .132     
          
Table 3. The ratio R/Y and the variables WEB and TR by country 
Country R/Y WEB  TR  Country  R/Y  WEB TR 
Armenia 20.13  0.50  2.52  Iran  32.49 0.83 0.23 
Australia  2.79 6.46 1.32  Israel  4.83  4.71 4.67 
Austria 2.43 4.77 4.88  Italy  3.00  5.01 2.97 
Azerbaijan 72.58  0.49  1.11 Kazakistan  30.72 0.27 0.65 
Belarus 32.61  1.63  1.31  Lituania  12.77 2.82 3.06 
Brazil 26.01  1.20 0.26  Moldova  102.27 0.96 3.45 
Bulgaria 26.09  2.84  2.61  Mongolia 130.43 0.80 1.09 
Canada  2.76 6.26 0.99  Netherlands 2.46  6.14 3.01 
Chile 15.33  2.67 3.05  Peru  34.48 1.17 0.36 
China 51.72 0.73 0.01  Poland 12.66 2.36 3.63 
Croatia 11.17 2.93 14.07  Portugal  5.39  2.81 3.10 
Czech 8.40 4.70 7.92 Romania 23.50 2.08 2.10 
Denmark 1.90  6.96  17.11 Russa  20.18 1.11 2.63 
Ecuador 34.22  0.48  2.41  Singapore 3.27  5.71 3.94 
England  2.39 6.28 0.34  Slovenia 5.19  4.76 11.55 
Spain 3.55 3.36 6.47  Slovakia  11.32 4.23 3.94 
France 2.59 4.14 3.84  Turkmenistan 96.67 0.08 0.70 
Georgia 66.67  0.39  4.24  Turkey  19.11 1.43 0.49 
Germany  2.60 5.00 2.85  Ucraine 59.21 0.79 1.92 
Greece 4.58 1.77 6.57  USA  2.06  6.30 0.36 
Hungary 8.97  2.67 15.35  India  125.00 0.32 0.05 
Indonesia 70.31  0.66  0.01 Vietnam  145.16 0.71 0.03 
      
  
Table 4. Ordered Probit and Random Effects Ordered Probit 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 






































































Internet users per 1000 inhabitants 
WEB 






Number of tournaments per million 
inhabitants TR 






Lagged number of games         
Lagged ELO         
Lagged rank         
Number of observations  9244  9244 9244 9244  2269 
Pseudo R Squared  0.079 0.237 .238    .203 
         
Notes: One, two and three stars for coefficients statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level of confidence. Table 5. Actual and predicted probabilities. Predicted probabilities are from the specification in 
column (3) of Table 4. 






Actual probability of dropping out  0.246 0.291  0.215  0.299 
Predicted probability of dropping out  0.234 0.257  0.210  0.298 
        
Actual probability of waiting  0.673 0.640  0.694  0.644 
Predicted probability of waiting  0.663 0.668  0.668  0.632 
        
Actual probability of trying out  0.080 0.068  0.091  0.055 
Predicted probability of trying out  0.102 0.075  0.122  0.070 
         
Table 6. Proportional Cox Model with Competing Risks 
 dropout  tryout 






































    
Number of observations  27786 27786 
    
  
Table 7. Maximum likelihood estimates of p, c, ρ and σ.  




Low income  
countries 
RES 
      

































σ age 15  3.440 3.241 0.927  2.122 
σ age 20  1.274 2.059 0.589  0.898 
σ age 23  0.471 1.308 0.374  0.380 
































Pseudo R Squared  .109 .236 
Likelihood ratio test (Chi 
Squared with 8 df) 
       1607.2 
Number of observations  8883 3820  3987  1076 
       
Notes: one, two and three stars for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. Asymptotic 























Table 8. Maximum likelihood estimates of p, c, ρ and σ. With errors in the measurement of 
performance. 
 Russia  Spain  India 
      
























σ age 15  1.510  1.048  2.105 
σ age 20  0.760  0.633  0.847 
σ age 23  0.382  0.383  0.341 
























Pseudo R Squared  .179  .212  .189 
Number of observations  2577  3987  1076 
     
Notes: one, two and three stars for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. Asymptotic 





















  Figure 2. Relationship between p, σ  and 
D
k θ .μ=0.87  c=80 k=10 
 
 
 Figure 3. Relationship between p, σ  and 
W
k θ .  μ=0.87  c=80 k=10 
  
  
Figure 4. Relationship between p, σ  and ( w
k θ - D
k θ ) at μ=0.87  c=80 k=10.  
  



























































Figure 6. Nonparametric competing risks: cumulative hazard into professional life (tryout) and 
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Figure 7. Nonparametric competing risks: cumulative hazard into professional life (tryout) and 
dropout cumulative hazard (dropout). Ex-soviet countries (in red), rich countries (in blue) and the 
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 Figure 8. Percentage of players aged 10 to 30 in their initial year in the sample who have passed 
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